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INTRODUCTION 
In the development of America's institutions, two 
basic principles concerning education and religion have 
emerged. First, public schools will be provided for all 
who wish to attend, and they will be free from sectarian 
domination. Second, the United States is fundamentally a 
religious nation, and its institutions are based on this 
premise. 
Since World War II there has been a renewed inter-
est in the public schools and in religion as two of the 
fundamental ways in which to preserve democracy in the 
United States. Although the majority of the people in 
the United States may accept this theory, this does not 
negate the problem of the relation that should exist be-
tween the public schools and religion. 
Since 1945 several cases have been appealed to the 
United States Supreme Court in an effort to obtain a 
legal decision as to the proper relationship. 
THE PROBLEM 
Statement of the problem. The purpose of this 
study was (1) to examine the United States Supreme Court 
cases since 1946 that deal with the relationship between 
religion and the public schools, (2) to analyze the 
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opinions of the different Justices on the cases, and 
(3) to consider the interpretations of the decisions of 
the Court by various lay persons. 
Importance of the study. The legal basis for 
cases appealed to the United States Supreme Court is the 
First Amendment of the United States Constitution which 
states in part, "Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exer-
cise thereof." During the l940's the Supreme Court in-
terpreted the Fourteenth Amendment as making the First 
Amendment applicable to the states. The first section of 
the Fourteenth Amendment contains this statement: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens 
of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citi-
zens of the United States; nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws. 
The problem of deciding the legal relationship be-
tween the public schools and religion centers around the 
interpretations of the First Amendment, particularly the 
clause prohibiting the establishment of religion. Two 
main interpretations of the First Amendment have devel-
oped, (1) no special privilege or preference can be given 
to one church or religion, but if all churches and all 
religions are treated equally then states may aid 
churches, and (2) government may not aid one denomina- 3 
tion, several denominations, or all denominations. Both, 
of these interpretations have been revealed in the Su-
preme Court cases examined in this study, 
F. Ernest Johnson has stated that it seems the 
issue is between those who, pointing to the long struggle 
to free the schools from religious sectarianism, insist 
on "keeping the public schools public," and those who in-
sist that in order to be truly "public" the schools 
should be more responsive to the expressed will of the 
community with respect to the religious phases of general 
education.1 Some argue that statements such as 
Mr. Johnson's are socially important but legally irrele-
vant. This may be a valid criticism. However, it is im-
portant that the opinions of Justices and lay persons 
that are stated in both legal and social contexts be ex-
amined since these opinions determine the extent to which 
a decision of the Supreme Court, in an individual case, 
will be applied in different communities and by the 
states. 
Limiting the study. The study was limited to an 
analysis of four pertinent cases which have been adjudi-
cated before the Supreme Court of the United States. The 
Ernest Johnson, "A Guide To Group Study of 
Religion and Public Education," Religious Education. 
48:4.22-430, November-December, 1953. 
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cases are: 
1. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947) 
2. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 
333 U. S. 203 (1948) 
3. Zorach et al. v. Clauson et al., 343 U. S. 306 (1952) 
4.. Engel et al. v. Vitale et al., 370 U. S. lj.21 (1962) 
Each of the four cases concerns a different school 
connected subject which is employed to introduce the cases 
in accordance with their above mentioned order. 
Procedures, The procedures used in making this 
report were: 
1. An examination of the text of the selected cases 
2. A survey of the literature available in the Kansas 
State University library concerning the relationship 
of religion and the public schools, with special em-
phasis on the selected cases 
FREE BUS TRANSPORTATION FOR PAROCHIAL SCHOOL STUDENTS 
In 1947 the United States Supreme Court handed 
down its decision in Everson v. Board of Education, 
330 U. S. 1. The Court in a five-to-four decision sus-
tained the right of local school authorities, acting 
under a New Jersey statute, to provide free bus transpor-
tation for children attending parochial schools. The 
Court also declared that the action of authorities was 
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not in violation of any part of the Federal Constitution, 
The New Jersey statute referred to in this case 
provided that a school district may make rules and con-
tracts for the transportation of children to and from 
school, "'including the transportation of school children 
to and from school other than a public school as is oper-
ated for profit in whole or in part,'" The statute goes 
on to state that when a school district provides trans-
portation for public school children to and from school, 
transportation "'shall be supplied to school children re-
siding in such school district in going to and from 
school other than a public school, except such school as 
is operated for profit In whole or in part. . .'"1 
In accordance with this statute the school board 
of the Township of Ewing reimbursed parents for the money 
they spent sending their children to school on regular 
buses operated by the public transportation system. By 
order of the board, some of the reimbursement went to 
parents whose children had been sent to Catholic parochial 
schools. A suit was filed in a New Jersey court by 
Everson, a taxpayer of the district. He contended that 
the statute and the resulting action of the school board 
1Clark Spurlock, Education and the Supreme Court 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1955), p. 79, 
citing Edgar W. Knight and Clifton L. Hall, Readings in 
American Educational History (New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts, 1951), pp. 767, 768. 
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violated both the State and the Federal Constitutions. 
This court held that the legislature did not have the 
power to authorize such reimbursement under the state 
constitution. However, the New Jersey Court of Errors 
and Appeals reversed this decision. It stated neither 
the statute nor the resolution of the school board was in 
conflict with the State constitution or the provisions of 
the Federal Constitution in issue. Everson then appealed 
the case to the Supreme Court.1 
The opinion of the Supreme Court was delivered by 
Mr. Justice Black.2 He first established that the Court 
was not concerned with the exclusion clause of the stat-
ute because there had been no attack on the statute on 
this ground. 
Mr. Justice Black continued with the opinion of 
the Court by pointing out that the only contention is 
that the state statute and the township's resolution vio-
late the Federal Constitution, in as much as they author-
ized reimbursement to parents of children attending 
parochial schools. He stated there were two aspects of 
this contention. 
First. The due process clause of the Fourteenth 
1Spurlock, p. 79; Everson v. Board of Education, 
330 U. S. 1, 1-4. 
2Everson v. Board of Education. 330 U. S. 1, 3-18. 
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Amendment is violated because the state is authorized to 
take by taxation the private property of some and give it 
to others to be used for their own private purposes. The 
argument is that the children attending church schools 
are doing so because of the personal desires of their par-
ents rather than to satisfy the public's interest in the 
general education of all children. The New Jersey legis-
lature, however, has decided that a public purpose is 
served by using tax-raised funds to pay the bus fares of 
all school children, including those who attended paro-
chial schools. "The fact that a state law, passed to 
satisfy a public need, coincides with the personal de-
sires of the individual most directly affected is cer-
tainly an inadequate reason for us to say that a legisla-
ture has erroneously appraised the public need." 
There have been instances when the Court has 
invalidated a state statute on the grounds that the pur-
pose for which tax-raised funds were to be expended was 
not a public one. However, the Court has always warned 
against using this authority without caution, because a 
state's authority to legislate for the public welfare may 
be seriously curtailed. The Fourteenth Amendment did not 
strip states of the power to legislate to meet new public 
problems. 
Second. The New Jersey statute was challenged as 
a "law respecting an establishment of religion." The 
First Amendment, made applicable to the states by the 8 
Fourteenth Amendment, forbids the making of such a law. 
In order to determine whether the New Jersey law violates 
the First Amendment requires an understanding of the back-
ground and the environment In which this Amendment was 
written and adopted. Mr. Justice Black continued with 
the following historical review. 
A large number of the people who came to this 
country from Europe to settle, were attempting to escape 
the civil strife and persecution that resulted from es-
tablished sects trying to maintain their absolute politi-
cal and religious supremacy. Among the offenses for 
which punishment resulted were non attendance at govern-
ment-established churches, expression of non belief in 
these churches' doctrines, and failure to pay taxes and 
tithes to support them. To a large extent these prac-
tices were transplanted to America. Various sects, such 
as the Catholics, Quakers, and Baptists were persecuted. 
All dissenters of the established church were required to 
pay taxes and tithes to help support the government-
sponsored church. The practices became so commonplace 
that the "freedom-loving colonials" developed a feeling 
of abhorrence for such practices. It was such feelings 
which found expression in the First Amendment. 
The movement against an established church reached 
its climax In Virginia. The Virginia legislature In 
1784-85 was about to renew the tax levy for the estab- 9 
lished church in Virginia. It was at this time that 
Madison wrote his Memorial and Remonstrance. In this 
paper, he argued that no non believer or believer should 
be taxed to support a religious institution, and that 
persecutions were the inevitable result of an established 
church. The tax measure was not passed, and the legisla-
ture enacted the Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty, 
originally written by Thomas Jefferson. The statute 
stated: 
. . . that no man shall be compelled to frequent or 
support any religious worship, place, or ministry 
whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, 
molested, or burthened, in his body or goods, nor 
shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious 
opinions or belief. . . 
The Court has previously recognized that the provisions 
of the First Amendment, in which Madison had a large part 
in the drafting and adopting, had the same objective and 
intended to provide the same protection as the Virginia 
statute. 
Mr. Justice Black felt that the "establishment of 
religion" clause of the First Amendment meant at least 
this: 
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up 
a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one reli-
gion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over 
another. Neither can force nor influence a person to 
go to or to remain away from church against his will 
or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any 
religion. No person can be punished for entertaining 
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or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for 
church attendance or non attendance. No tax in any 
amount, large or small, can be levied to support any 
religious activities or institutions, whatever they 
may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to 
teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the 
Federal Government can, openly or secretly, partici-
pate in the affairs of any religious organizations or 
groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, 
the clause against establishment of religion by law 
was intended to erect 'a wall of separation' between 
Church and State. 
In the effort to judge the New Jersey statute, it 
must be done according to the limitations of the First 
Amendment. However, precaution must be taken to not in-
validate the statute if it is within the State's consti-
tutional powers, "even though it approaches the verge of 
that power . . . " New Jersey cannot give tax-raised 
funds directly to an institution that teaches the doc-
trines of any church. However, the state cannot exclude 
the citizens professing the belief or non belief of a cer-
tain faith from receiving the benefits of public welfare 
legislation. "Measured by these standards, we cannot say 
that the First Amendment prohibits New Jersey from spend-
ing tax-raised funds to pay bus fares of pupils attending 
public and other schools." It is true children are 
helped to get to church schools. If services such as 
police and fire protection, public highways and sidewalks, 
and sewage connections were withheld from church schools, 
it is possible parents would be reluctant to send their 
children to such schools. However, this is not the 
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purpose of the First Amendment. This Amendment requires 
the state to be neutral, but not an adversary of reli-
gious groups or groups of non believers. 
Mr. Justice Black concluded, "The First Amendment 
has erected a wall between church and state. That wall 
must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve 
the slightest breach. New Jersey has not breached it 
here." 
Mr. Justice Jackson wrote a dissenting opinion.1 
He felt that the Court's opinion advocating complete sep-
aration of church and state seemed completely discordant 
with its conclusion to permit the commingling of the two. 
This case reminded him of Julia who, according to Bryon's 
reports, "'whispering 'I will ne'er consent,'—consented.'" 
Mr. Justice Jackson continued with his opinion by 
analyzing the case. He felt that the Township of Ewing 
was not actually furnishing transportation itself. It 
was simply reimbursing parents who sent their children to 
school on public transportation. This payment of tax 
funds in no way affected the child's safety or expedition 
in transit. Thus, the Court was assuming a service that 
did not exist. 
Mr. Justice Jackson also felt that the Court was 
asking "us" to close our eyes to the exclusive nature of 
1Everson v. Board of Education. 330 U. S. 1, 18-28. 
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this expenditure of tax money. "The New Jersey Act in 
question makes the character of the school, not the needs 
of the children, determine the eligibility of parents to 
receive reimbursement." If the state were impartial in 
its aid, there is no reason why children attending pri-
vate schools operated in part or in the whole for profit 
should not also receive reimbursement. These children 
are often as needy or worthy of such aid as those attend-
ing public and parochial schools. 
The parochial school is a vital part of the Roman 
Catholic Church. Its growth, loyalty, and discipline has 
its basis in its schools. Mr. Justice Jackson stated, 
"Catholic education is the rock on which the whole struc-
ture rests, and to render tax aid to Its Church school is 
indistinguishable to me from rendering the same aid to 
the Church itself." 
It seemed to Mr. Justice Jackson " . . . that the 
basic fallacy in the Court's reasoning, which accounts 
for its failure to apply the principles it avows, is in 
ignoring the essentially religious test by which benefi-
ciaries of this expenditure are selected." The fireman 
or policeman does not have to stop and ask before he ren-
ders aid whether it is a Catholic institution or a public 
one. However, the school authorities must ask this ques-
tion before reimbursement may be given. 
In conclusion, Mr. Justice Jackson stated that the 
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First Amendment was so placed because it was first in the 
forefathers' minds. The First Amendment was intended: 
. . .not only to keep the states' hands out of reli-
gions but to keep religion's hands off the state, and 
above all, to keep bitter religious controversy out 
of public life by denying to every denomination any 
advantage from getting control of public policy or 
the public purse. Those great ends I cannot but 
think are immeasurably compromised by today's deci-
sion . . . 
Mr. Justice Rutledge wrote a separate dissenting 
opinion1 in which he examined the history of the First 
Amendment, particularly in regard to Madison's views 
toward church and state, in an effort to show that this 
Amendment was intended "to create a complete and perma-
nent separation, of the spheres of religious activity and 
civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every form 
of public aid or support for religion.1" Several impor-
tant points are brought out in Mr. Justice Rutledge's re-
view of Madison's ideas. 
Madison felt that religious freedom was the crux 
of the struggle for freedom in general. He continually 
fought for this principle. He led the fight in 1779 for 
Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom. In 
the climax in 1784-85 over the Assessment Bill, Madison 
was a leader of the opposition to this Bill. Even in its 
final form which gave the taxpayer the privilege of 
1Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 28-74. 
designating which church should receive his share of the 14 
taxes, or the option of giving his tax to education, 
Madison opposed the Bill. He was able to prevent its 
passage In December 1784. Madison then issued his Memor-
ial and Remonstrance which was an "attack upon all forms 
of 'establishment' of religion, both general and particu-
lar, nondiscriminatory or selective." The Assessment 
Bill died in committee after the legislature reconvened 
in November 1785, and Madison was able to push the pass-
ing of Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious Free-
dom. Within a little more than three years of this 
victory, Madison proposed and secured the ratification of 
the First Amendment as the first article of the Bill of 
Rights of the United States Constitution. 
The historical facts definitely show that Madison 
was opposed to every form and degree of official rela-
tions between religious and civil authority, and particu-
larly he opposed state support or aid by taxation. "In 
view of this history no further proof is needed that the 
Amendment forbids any appropriation, large or small, from 
public funds to aid or support any and all religious 
exercises." 
Mr. Justice Rutledge continued with his opinion by 
examining the facts of this case. Transportation, where 
needed, is essential for bringing the child and teacher 
together. The cost of transportation in the total 
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expenditures of a school, is as essential as the cost of 
textbooks, equipment, school lunches, and teachers' sal-
aries. "For me, therefore, the feat is impossible to 
select so indispensable an item from the composite of 
total costs, and characterize it as not aiding, contrib-
uting to, promoting or sustaining the propagation of be-
liefs which it is the very end of all to bring about." 
Transportation is as directly related to education in a 
parochial school, which has a religious objective, as it 
is in a public school. 
The majority has concluded, Mr. Justice Rutledge 
continued, that the New Jersey statute is simply "public 
welfare legislation," because it promotes education which 
is a public, not a private purpose. If this were the only 
fact, the state should allow full appropriation for reli-
gious schools, as it does for public schools. 
One can be sympathetic toward the burden that our 
Constitutional separation places on parents who wish for 
their children to receive religious instruction with 
their secular education. They must pay for their own 
child's education, and at the same time pay taxes to sup-
port others' children education. However, one cannot 
allow such feelings to prevail. If they do, our Consti-
tutional policy and command will end. The child attending 
a religious school has the same right as others to attend 
the public school, "But he foregoes exercising it 
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because the same guaranty which assures this freedom for-
bids the public school or any agency of the state to give 
or aid him in securing the religious instruction he 
seeks." 
Mr. Justice Rutledge concluded that even If the 
New Jersey statute applied equally to all religious 
schools of any faith, It would not be valid. Persons 
would still be forced to furnish "'contributions of money 
for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves. 
The Constitution requires, not comprehensive identifica-
tion of state with religion, but complete separation . .'" 
The affirmative decision of the Court in the 
Everson v. Board of Education case evoked various reac-
tions from lay persons. An editorial in The Christian 
Century and an article by Edward J. Heffron in The Com-
monweal are examples of the two extremes in opinions ex-
pressed by lay persons. 
The Christian Century felt the decision in the 
Everson case "should open the eyes of all American-minded 
citizens, and especially Protestant citizens, to the 
strategy of the Roman Catholic Church in its determina-
tion to secure a privileged position in the common life 
of this country."1 The editorial went on to state that 
1The Christian Century. 64:262-26l, February 26, 
1947. 
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the Roman Catholic Church is aiming for complete state 
support. The Church knows it cannot appeal for such sup-
port directly because the majority of the American people 
would object. Therefore, the Catholic Church is attest-
ing "to crack a Constitutional principle where average 
citizens will not be aware of it." It chooses a point 
which is obscured by sentimental or humanitarian appeal. 
The Christian Century pointed out one aspect in this case 
that possibly the Justices overlooked. School funds 
raised for the specific purpose of the public schools 
were used for reimbursement, not general welfare funds. 
Edward Heffron supported the Supreme Court deci-
sion. He stated that a child is sent to a parochial 
school because the parents want the child educated in a 
way that strengthens rather than undermines his faith. 
Secular education is important in the parochial school, 
and it serves a public purpose. Therefore, the aid reli-
gion may have received was only by the way of New Jersey's 
commitment to aid secular education which Is a public 
purpose. The main point that Mr. Heffron felt had been 
overlooked was that "if it's Constitutional for the state 
to compel attendance, it should be Constitutional for the 
state to facilitate the attendance it compels."1 
1Edward J. Heffron, "Supreme Court Oversight," The 
Commonweal, 46:9-11, April 18, 1947. 
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Many lay persons were more moderate in their opin-
ion of the Everson decision, and they attempted to analyze 
the implications of the case. It is Important to note 
that both the majority of the Court and the dissenting 
Justices recognized the "wall of separation" principle. 
Mr. Justice Black in his explanation of the meaning of 
the "establishment of religion" clause, revealed that the 
decision in this case did not sanction public funds for 
establishment of religion, rather aid to parochial school 
children might be given only if the benefit to religion 
was incidental. The dissenting Justices felt religion 
was directly aided even though the reimbursement was 
given to the parochial school child rather than specifi-
cally to the school. The main point of disagreement was 
what constituted aid to religion, and how far might aid 
go before it was in violation of the Constitution. In 
other words, when is the "establishment of religion" 
clause breached? 
The Everson decision left two main questions un-
answered. The principle question has already been dis-
cussed to some extent. It was, "How far may the state 
validly go, under the 'child benefit theory' in granting 
benefits to parochial school children?"1 Harry Rosenfield 
1Spurlock, p. 91, citing Robert E. Cushman, Lead-
ing Constitutional Decisions (New York! Appleton-Century-
Crofts, 1950), p. 145. 
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felt that it would involve constant litigation to test 
whether a particular form of aid was general welfare 
legislation and whether benefits to religious institu-
tions were merely incidental or pass beyond "'the verge.'"l 
R. E. Cushman pointed out another important ques-
tion. ". . . if a community is not forbidden to give free 
bus service to all school children, including parochial 
school children, may Catholic parents, demand such service 
as a Constitutional right from communities which now ex-
tend it only to public school children?..."2 This 
question may have to be settled by the Court at some 
future time. 
The decision in the Everson case confused the 
issue on what constituted an "establishment of religion." 
It was not long before a case came before the Supreme 
Court, which attempted to clarify the meaning of this 
clause. 
RELEASED TIME FOR ON — PREMISE RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION 
Approximately one year after the Everson v. Board 
of Education decision by the United States Supreme Court, 
1Harry N. Rosenfield, "The Supreme Court Decides 
the Parochial School Bus Case," The Nation's Schools, 
39:41-43, April, 1947. 
2Spurlock, p. 91, citing Robert E. Cushman, p. 145. 
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the Court rendered a decision in Illinois ex rel. McCollum 
v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203 (1948). In an 
eight-to-one decision the Supreme Court held that reli-
gious instruction in the public school buildings during 
public school time as practiced in the schools of 
Champaign, Illinois, was invalid. Under the First Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution it amounted to an 
establishment of religion. 
The Champaign, Illinois, "released time" program 
was set up in the following way. The Champaign Council 
on Religious Education consisting of members of the 
Jewish, Roman Catholic and Protestant faiths obtained 
permission from the Board of Education to offer classes 
in religious instruction to public school pupils In 
grades four through nine. Classes consisted of pupils 
whose parents signed printed cards requesting that their 
children be permitted to attend. The cards were printed 
at the expense of the Council on Religious Education, and 
were passed out by the teachers in the public schools. 
The classes were conducted in the regular classrooms of 
the school buildings once a week for thirty minutes for 
the lower grades and forty-five minutes for the upper 
grades. Classes were taught In three separate religious 
groups by Protestant teachers, Catholic priests, and a 
Jewish rabbi. The Council employed the religious teach-
ers at no expense to the school authorities, but the 
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instructors were subject to the approval and supervision 
of the superintendent of schools. Students who did not 
take part in the religious instruction classes were not 
excused from public school duties, and were required to 
leave their classroom and go to some other place in the 
school building to continue their secular studies. The 
students who were released for religious instruction were 
required to be present at the religious classes. Reports 
of their presence or absence were made to their secular 
teachers. 
Vashti McCollum, mother of a son In attendance and 
a resident and taxpayer in the Champaign school district, 
petitioned to the Circuit Court of Champaign County, 
Illinois, for a writ of mandamus to compel the school 
board to stop permitting religious classes in the schools 
during regular school hours. Mrs. McCollum, an atheist, 
charged that this joint public-school religious-group 
program violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution. The Circuit Court dis-
missed Mrs. McCollum's petition and this dismissal was 
affirmed by the Supreme Court of Illinois. Mrs. McCollum 
then took her case by appeal to the United States Supreme 
Court, which reversed the Illinois Supreme Court decision.1 
1 Spurlock, pp. 116-118; Illinois ex rel. McCollum 
v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 203-209. 
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The opinion of the United States Supreme Court was 
delivered by Mr. Justice Black.1 He first reviewed the 
facts of the case and then stated: 
The foregoing facts, without reference to others that 
appear in the record, show the use of tax-supported 
property for religious instruction and the close 
cooperation between the school authorities and the 
religious council in promoting religious education. 
The operation of the State's compulsory education 
system thus assists and is integrated with the pro-
gram of religious instruction carried on by separate 
religious sects. Pupils compelled by law to go to 
school for secular education are released in part 
from their legal duty upon the condition that they 
attend the religious classes. This is beyond all 
question a utilization of the tax-established and 
tax-supported public school system to aid religious 
groups to spread their faith. And it falls squarely 
under the ban of the First Amendment as we inter-
preted it in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 
U. S. 1. 
Mr. Justice Black pointed out that in the Everson 
case both the majority and the minority agreed that the 
First Amendment erected a wall of separation between 
Church and State. They disagreed as to the proper appli-
cation of the language of the First Amendment to the 
facts of the case. 
Mr. Justice Black stated that the counsel for the 
respondent recognized that the Illinois plan was barred 
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments If the Court ad-
hered to the views expressed by the majority and the 
minority in the Everson case. Therefore, the counsel 
1Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 
333 U. S. 203, 204-212. 
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challenged these views as dicta and urged that the Court 
reconsider and repudiate them. The counsel argued that 
historically the First Amendment was meant only to forbid 
government preferring one religion over another, not an 
impartial government assistance of all religions. Als0, 
the counsel asked that the Court overrule its holding in 
the Everson case that the Fourteenth Amendment made the 
"establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment 
applicable as a prohibition against the States. Mr. Jus-
tice Black stated that "after giving full consideration 
to the arguments presented we are unable to accept either 
of these contentions." 
Mr. Justice Black declared that a governmental 
hostility toward religion and religious teachings is not 
manifested when the state is prohibited by the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments from utilizing the public school 
system to aid any or all religious faiths. If there were 
such a manifestation, this would be against the national 
tradition of the United States as embodied in the First 
Amendment guaranty of the free exercise of religion. 
"For the First Amendment rests upon the premise that both 
religion and government can best work to achieve their 
lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its 
respective sphere." 
In conclusion, Mr. Justice Black stated: 
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school buildings used for the dissemination of reli-
gious doctrines, the State also affords sectarian 
groups an invaluable aid in that it helps to provide 
pupils for their religious classes through use of the 
State's compulsory public school machinery. This is 
not separation of Church and State. 
Two concurring opinions were written in McCollum v. 
Board of Education. One opinion was delivered by Mr. 
Justice Frankfurter.1 He noted that the four Justices 
joining in this opinion dissented in Everson v. Board of 
Education, 330 U. S. 1, because they felt the Constitu-
tional principle requiring separation of Church and State 
had been violated by New Jersey. The facts in McCollum 
v. Board of Education indicated that Illinois "authorized 
the commingling of sectarian with secular instruction in 
the public schools. The Constitution of the United 
States forbids this." 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter continued by pointing out 
that the McCollum case demonstrated once again that the 
formulation of a Constitutional principle was not the an-
swer to a problem but only a beginning of its solution. 
The meaning of a principle such as separation of Church 
and State is unfolded as appeal Is made to it from case 
to case. Agreement has been reached that the First 
Amendment erects a "wall of separation between Church and 
1Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 
333 U. S. 203, 212-232. 
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State." However, this agreement does not preclude a 
clash of views as to what the wall separates. In order 
to enlightenly apply the "wall of separation" metaphor, 
one must consider the relevant history of religious edu-
cation in America, the place of the "released time" move-
ment in that history, and its precise manifestation in 
the case before the Court. 
Traditionally, organized education In the Western 
world was Church education. The people who settled in 
America brought this view of education with them. The 
development of the public school system from colonial 
education with a religious orientation is due to changing 
concepts concerning "the American democratic society, the 
functions of State-maintained education in such a society, 
and of the role therein of the free exercise of religion 
by the people." 
One may recall James Madison's fight for religious 
liberty In Virginia. Other states such as New York and 
Massachusetts were scenes of efforts to dissociate reli-
gious teaching from State-maintained schools. Thus, sep-
aration in the field of education was not forced upon the 
States by a superior law In the form of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. This Amendment merely reflected a principle 
then dominant in the United States. 
It is important to remember that the development 
of the Separation principle was not due to a decline In 
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the religious beliefs of the people. Mr. Justice Frank-
furter stated: 
The sharp confinement of the public schools to secu-
lar education was a recognition of the need of a 
democratic society to educate its children, insofar 
as the State undertook to do so, in an atmosphere 
free from pressures in a realm in which pressures are 
most resisted and where conflicts are most easily and 
most bitterly engendered. Designed to serve as per-
haps the most powerful agency for promoting cohesion 
among a heterogeneous democratic people, the public 
school must keep scrupulously free from entanglement 
in the strife of sects. 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter continued his opinion with 
a brief summary of the history of the "released time" 
movement. The first attempt by churches to promote reli-
gious education was the establishment of Church Schools. 
Many of these had difficulties, such as financial prob-
lems. Also, there were experiments with vacation schools, 
with Saturday as well as Sunday schools, however, these 
fell short of their purpose. Week-day church schools 
held after school hours developed, but it was difficult 
to maintain attendance. Leaders decided that if a week-
day church school was to succeed a way had to be found to 
give the child his religious education during what the 
child conceives as his "'business hours,'" meaning during 
school hours. 
The "released time" movement was initiated by 
Dr. George U. Wenner in 1905. He made a proposal at the 
Interfaith Conference on Federation held in New York urg-
ing that children be excused from public school on 
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Wednesday afternoon for religious instruction. This pro-
posal aroused considerable objections, and it was not 
until a decade later before Gary, Indiana, inaugurated 
the movement in Its school system. Since this beginning 
in 1914 when 619 students participated in the program, 
the movement in 1947 bad grown to include almost 2,000,000 
pupils in 2,200 communities. 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter continued by pointing out 
that there are many different arrangements for released 
time programs. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the 
particulars of each type of arrangement in order to apply 
the test of the Separation principle. 
The facts of the Champaign plan show religious 
education is patently woven into the working scheme of 
the school. "The Champaign arrangement thus presents 
powerful elements of inherent pressure by the school sys-
tem in the interest of religious sects." There are some 
children in the public schools who belong to sects that 
do not participate in the "released time" program. 
Therefore, the public school system is actually further-
ing inculcation in the religious tenets of some faiths, 
and in the process is sharpening the consciousness of re-
ligious differences, at least among some of the children 
in the public schools. 
In conclusion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated: 
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Separation means separation, not something less. 
Jefferson's metaphor in describing the relation be-
tween Church and State speaks of a 'wall of separa-
tion, ' not of a fine line easily overstepped . . . 
'The great American principle of eternal separation' 
—Elihu Root's phrase bears repetition— is one of the 
vital reliances of our Constitutional system for as-
suring unities among our people stronger than our 
diversities. . . If nowhere else, in the relation 
between Church and State, 'good fences make good 
neighbors.' 
Mr. Justice Jackson delivered the second concur-
ring opinion in McCollum v. Board of Education.1 He con-
curred with the result reached by the Court, however he 
felt that some bounds should be placed "on the demands of 
interference with local schools that we are empowered or 
willing to entertain." 
Mr. Justice Jackson felt that a Federal Court could 
interfere with local school authorities only when either 
personal liberty or a property right protected by the 
Federal Government had been Invaded. There are two ways 
in which this may occur. First, "when a person is re-
quired to submit to some religious rite or instruction or 
is deprived or threatened with deprivation of his freedom 
for resisting such unconstitutional requirement. We may 
then set him free or enjoin his prosecution." In this 
case no legal compulsion is applied to the complainant's 
son and no penalty is imposed or threatened from which 
the Court can relieve him. ". . .we can hardly base 
1Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 
333 U. S. 203, 232-238. 
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jurisdiction on this ground." Second, "where a complain-
ant is deprived of property by being taxed for unconsti-
tutional purposes, such as directly or indirectly to 
support a religious establishment, we can protect the tax-
payer against such a levy." This was the situation in 
Everson v. Board of Education. However, in the present 
case any cost to the taxpayer for the "released time" 
program is negligible. 
Mr. Justice Jackson continued by stating that if 
"jurisdiction is found to exist, it is important that we 
circumscribe our decision with some care." In this case 
the relief asked is that writ be issued against the Board 
of Education "'ordering it to immediately adopt and en-
force rules and regulations prohibiting all instruction 
in and teaching of religious education in all public 
schools... and in all public houses and buildings in 
said district when occupied by public schools.'" In 
other words the plaintiff has asked the Court to not only 
ban the "released time" program but also to ban every 
form of teaching which suggests or recognizes there is a 
God. The Court has in a sense sustained the plaintiff's 
whole complaint without discriminating between any of the 
grounds of that complaint and without laying down any 
standards to define the limits of the effect of that de-
cision. It seemed to Mr. Justice Jackson that the sweep 
and the detail of the complaints by Mrs. McCollum were a 
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"danger signal which warns of the kind of local contro-
versy we, the Supreme Court, will be required to arbi-
trate If we do not place appropriate limitation on our 
decision and exact strict compliance with jurisdictional 
requirements." 
The Court should and may prohibit such direct and 
explicit religious teaching as in the Champaign plan and 
in the teaching of a creed or catechism in the public 
schools. 
Mr. Justice Jackson felt that it remained to be 
demonstrated whether it was possible or even desirable to 
comply completely to the demands of Mrs. McCollum. He 
continued with this statement: 
Perhaps subjects such as mathematics, physics or 
chemistry are, or can be, completely secularized. 
But it would not seem practical to teach either prac-
tice or appreciation of the arts if we are to forbid 
exposure of youth to any religious influences. Music 
without sacred music, architecture minus the cathe-
dral, or painting without the scriptural themes would 
be eccentric and Incomplete, even from a secular 
point of view. Yet the Inspirational appeal of reli-
gion in these guises is often stronger than in forth-
right sermon. Even such a 'science' as biology 
raises the issue between evolution and creation as an 
explanation of our presence on this planet. Certainly 
a course in English literature that omitted the Bible 
and other powerful uses of our mother tongue for reli-
gious ends would be pretty barren. And I should sup-
pose it is a proper, if not an indispensable, part of 
preparation for a worldly life to know the role that 
religion and religions have played in the tragic 
story of mankind. The fact is that, for good or for 
ill, nearly everything in our culture worth transmit-
ting, everything which gives meaning to life, is 
saturated with religious influences, derived from 
paganism, Judaism, Christianity—both Catholic and 
Protestant—and other faiths accepted by a large part 
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of the world's peoples. One can hardly respect a 
system of education that would leave the student 
wholly ignorant of the currents of religious thought 
that move the world society for a part in which he is 
being prepared. But how one can teach, with satis-
faction or even with justice to all faiths,such sub-
jects as the story of the Reformation, the Inquisi-
tion, or even the New England effort to found 'a 
Church without a Bishop and a State without a King,' 
is more than I know. It is too much to expect that 
mortals will teach subjects about which their con-
temporaries have passionate controversies with the 
detachment they may summon to teaching about remote 
subjects such as Confucius or Mohammed. When In-
struction turns to proselyting and imparting know-
ledge becomes evangelism is, except in the crudest 
cases, a subtle inquiry. 
Mr. Justice Jackson recognized that local communi-
ties differed in racial, religious and cultural composi-
tion, and that no matter what customs were adopted there 
always would be a dissenting minority. Therefore, In the 
Court decision it must give the State court a standard by 
which to judge questions of the relationship between 
Church and State. The Court must also leave some flexi-
bility for local communities to meet changing conditions. 
The Court by pronouncing a broad, sweeping constitutional 
doctrine seems "to allow zeal for our own Ideas of what 
Is good in public instruction to Induce us to accept the 
role of a super board of education for every school dis-
trict in the nation." 
Mr. Justice Reed was the only Justice who dissented 
with the Court decision in this case.1 He felt the 
1Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 
333 U. S. 203, 238-256. 
Interpretation of the First Amendment was wrong. Mr. 
Justice Reed stated: 
By directing attention to the many instances of close 
association of church and state in American society 
and by recalling that many of these relations are so 
much a part of our tradition and culture that they 
are accepted without more, this dissent may help in 
an appraisal of the meaning of the clause of the 
First Amendment concerning the establishment of reli-
gion and of the reasons which lead to the approval or 
disapproval of the judgement below. 
Mr. Justice Reed felt it was difficult to find In 
the Court opinion and in the concurring opinions any con-
clusion as to what It was in the Champaign plan that was 
unconstitutional. "None of the reversing opinions say 
whether the purpose of the Champaign plan for religious 
instruction during school hours is unconstitutional or 
whether it is some ingredient used in or omitted from the 
formula that makes the plan unconstitutional." However, 
Mr. Justice Reed stated that from the language of the 
opinions he concluded that the majority felt that reli-
gious instruction of public school children during school 
hours is prohibited. In Mr. Justice Reed's opinion "the 
history of American education is against such an inter-
pretation of the First Amendment." 
Mr. Justice Reed stated that it was evident that 
the free exercise of religion had not been violated by 
Champaign, therefore the "released time" program only 
needed to be examined to see if it constituted an estab-
lishment of religion. In the remainder of his dissenting 
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opinion Mr. Justice Reed examined this question. 
Congress may have intended the "establishment of 
religion" clause to be aimed only at a state church. 
When the First Amendment was pending in Congress in sub-
stantially its present form, "'Mr. Madison said, he ap-
prehended the meaning of the words to be, that Congress 
should not establish a religion, and enforce the legal 
observation of it by law, nor compel men to worship God 
in any manner contrary to their conscience.'" Through 
the years the interpretation of this Amendment has broad-
ened. Mr. Justice Reed continued: 
. . . although never until today . . . has this Court 
widened its interpretation to any such degree as 
holding that recognition of the interest of our na-
tion in religion, through the granting, to qualified 
representatives of the principal faiths, of opportun-
ity to present religion as an optional, extracurricu-
lar subject during released school time in public 
school buildings, was equivalent to an establishment 
of religion. 
The opinions of eminent statesmen of early United 
States history, which were appealed to in Everson v. 
Board of Education and in this case under discussion, in-
dicate that circumstances such as the ones in the McCollum 
case were far from their minds. Mr. Justice Reed cited 
two examples. First, Thomas Jefferson was the founder of 
the University of Virginia which always has been under 
the complete control of the state. Drawing from the sug-
gestions of Jefferson, this regulation was adopted in 1824: 
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Should the religious sects of this State, or any of 
them, according to the invitation held out to them, 
establish within, or adjacent to, the precincts of 
the University, schools for instruction in the reli-
gion of their sect, the students of the University 
will be free, and expected to attend religious wor-
ship at the establishment of their respective sects, 
in the morning, ana in time to meet their school in 
the University at its stated hour. 
Thus, the "wall of separation between church and State" 
built by Thomas Jefferson at the University of Virginia 
did not exclude religious education from the school. 
Second, James Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance is not 
applicable in this case. This was simply a protest against 
taxation for support of religious institutions which was 
viewed as an establishment of religion. However, Mr. 
Madison did support Jefferson's suggestions concerning 
religion at the University of Virginia. In Mr. Justice 
Reed's opinion, the acceptance of this report gives 
"clearer indication of Mr. Madison's views on the consti-
tutionality of religious education in public schools than 
his general statements on a different subject." 
Mr. Justice Reed agreed that government could not 
set up a church or aid all or any religions or prefer one 
over another. He went on to state: 
But 'aid' must be understood as a purposeful assist-
ance directly to the church itself or to some reli-
gious group or organization doing religious work of 
such a character that it may fairly be said to be 
performing ecclesiastical functions. 'Prefer' must 
give advantage to one 'over another.' 
Several examples were cited by Mr. Justice Reed to 
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show that the 'aid' referred to by the Court in the Ever-
son case was not meant to include the incidental advan-
tages that religious bodies and other groups obtain as a 
by-product of an organized society. The affirmative de-
cision in the Everson case was justified partly by reasons 
of safety for the children or for public welfare reasons, 
In Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 281 
U. S. 370, the Court upheld a Louisiana statute allowing 
free textbooks to be furnished to private schools on the 
ground that the books were for education and not to aid 
religious schools. The National School Lunch Act aids 
all school children attending tax-exempt schools. 
The statute in question in the case now before the 
Court Is comparable to those in other states. Scores of 
cases concerning religion and the schools have come be-
fore state courts. Except where exercises with the reli-
gious significance of one sect were involved, the 
constitutionality of the practices challenged in these 
cases has been generally upheld. 
A number of practices by the Federal government 
offering examples of this type of 'aid' by the state to 
religion were cited by Mr. Justice Reed. Both Houses of 
Congress have a chaplain. The armed forces have commis-
sioned chaplains. Under the Servicemen's Readjustment 
Act of 1944 eligible veterans may receive training at 
government expense for the ministry at denominational 
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schools. The United States Naval Academy and the United 
States Military Academy both have chaplains and attend-
ance at church services Is compulsory. 
Mr. Justice Reed felt that in the light of the 
meaning given to the words of the First and the Four-
teenth Amendments by the precedents, customs, and prac-
tices he had cited, he could not agree with the Court 
that "when pupils compelled by law to go to school for 
secular education are released from school so as to 
attend the religious classes, churches are unconstitu-
tionally aided." A non sectarian group sponsoring a pro-
gram of religious education and using school buildings 
should not be condemned of establishing a religion when 
actual church services have been permitted on government 
property. "The prohibition of enactments respecting the 
establishment of religion do not bar every friendly ges-
ture between church and state." 
In conclusion Mr. Justice Reed stated: 
Devotion to the great principle of religious liberty 
should not lead us Into a rigid interpretation of the 
constitutional guarantee that conflicts with accepted 
habits of our people. This is an instance where, for 
me, the history of past practices is determinative of 
the meaning of a constitutional clause, not a decor-
ous introduction to its text. 
McCollum v. Board of Education is significant be-
cause it appears to be the first case in which either 
Federal or state action was declared by the Court to 
result in "an establishment of religion."1 However, the 37 
decision of the United States Supreme Court was on one 
hand phrased in broad general terms. On the other hand, 
the decision applied specifically to "released time" pro-
grams set up like the one in Champaign, Illinois. Conse-
quently, confusion resulted as to the legal relationship 
between religion and the public schools. 
The broad aspects of the Court's decision were re-
vealed principally in the majorities' interpretation of 
the First Amendment and of the historical relationship 
between Church and State. David Louisell and Luther 
Wiegle criticized this Interpretation. It seems they 
both agreed with Mr. Justice Reed's dissent. 
David Louisell felt that the Supreme Court's in-
terpretation represented an extremist's viewpoint. He 
felt that if one considered all the interrelationships 
between government and religion In the United States, "a 
doctrine of complete separation, of complete insulation 
of religion from the state . . . could stand neither an 
historical appraisal nor appraisal from the common sense 
viewpoint of the realities."2 
1Spurlock, p. 116. 
2David W. Louisell, "Constitutional Limitations 
and Supports for Dealing with Religion in Public Higher 
Education," Religious Education, 50: 285-290, September 
1955. 
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Luther Wiegle felt the Court's interpretation of 
the First Amendment as an absolute doctrine of separation 
of Church and State was false. He quoted Professor 
Corwin, an authority on Constitutional Law at Princeton 
University, to support his statement. Professor Corwin 
did not give any specific examples, but he stated: 
The Court's interpretation of what the First Amend-
ment meant to the founding fathers who propounded it 
and voted for it is untrue. . . a falsification of 
history produced by methods of handling the evidence 
which would shame any competent graduate student. 
Professor Corwin also felt that the Supreme Court through 
its decision was making a law prohibiting "the free exer-
cise" of religion. He conceded that some law making may 
be the function of the Supreme Court, however "'the fal-
sification of history with which it attempts to support 
the new interpretation cannot command respect.'"1 
Agnes Meyer took a different point of view of the 
broad aspects of the Supreme Court's decision than David 
Louisell and Luther Wiegle. While the latter two seemed 
to interpret the Court's opinion as a ban on all reli-
gious exercises and informal cooperation between religion 
and the public schools, Agnes Meyer felt that the Court's 
opinion in no way interfered "with broad religious exer-
cises such as are still customary in many of our 
1Luther Wiegle, "Crisis of Religion in Education," 
Religious Education. 49:73-77, March-April 1954, citing 
Professor Corwin. 
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schools . . . " In reaching this conclusion Mrs. Meyer 
seemed to accept the majority of the Court's interpreta-
tion of the historical development of the First Amendment 
and of the principal of separation as revealed both in 
the Everson case and in the McCollum case. Agnes Meyer 
noted that the significance of Jefferson's point of view 
for the present day is that he stressed that the comming-
ling of secular and religious instruction and the use of 
the school time for sectarian worship should be pre-
vented. "This," she felt, "is exactly the purpose of the 
majority opinion in the McCollum case." Agnes Meyer also 
emphasized what the Court implicitly pointed out in re-
gard to the development of American secular institutions. 
These institutions were a product of five centuries of 
thoughtful statesmanship. "They emerged out of the 
necessity to create harmony among diverse economic, phil-
osophical, social and religious beliefs." Although Agnes 
Meyer agreed with the Court's interpretation of the his-
torical background of the First Amendment and the doc-
trine of separation, as already indicated, she felt that 
the local community was free to decide upon non sectarian 
religious exercises.1 
Some lay persons interpreted the Supreme Court's 
1Agnes E. Meyer, "The School, The State, and The 
Church," Atlantic Monthly, l82:45-50, November, 1948. 
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decision by concentrating on the specific ban on a 
"released time" program such as Champaign's, and then 
attempted to find some implications of this pronounce-
ment. 
Madaline Remmlein emphasized that care must be 
taken in applying the Supreme Court's decision in the 
McCollum case to religious education programs that dif-
fered from the Champaign plan. Although she pointed out 
this precaution, Madaline Remmlein felt that ". . .it 
would seem that plans whereby pupils are released to go 
off school premises for religious instruction are equally 
unconstitutional, provided other factors are present to 
invalidate the plan." In fact, she felt it was possible 
that the decision applied to all types of religious edu-
cation involving public school cooperation with sectarian 
groups.1 
R. Lawrence Siegel in the implications he drew 
from the McCollum case decision agreed with Madaline 
Remmlein. Mr. Siegel felt that from the criteria devel-
oped by the majority " . . . any and all programs of reli-
gious instruction on released-time which utilize public 
machinery to secure enrollments and maintain attendance, 
fall tinder the constitutional ban." Mr. Siegel also felt 
1Madaline K. Remmelein, "Legal Aspects of Reli-
gious Instruction," The Nation's Schools, 4l:26-8, 
April, 1948. 
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that the decision implied a banning of all Federal and 
state funds in support of sectarian schools.1 
It must be remembered that the above statements 
are implications drawn from the Supreme Court's decision. 
They are not explicit in the majorities' opinion concern-
ing the McCollum case. This means there were questions 
left unanswered by the Supreme Court's decision in this 
case. Both Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Jack-
son in their concurring opinions and various lay persons 
Indicated that it was still uncertain how high the "wall 
of separation" stood. Are "released time" programs simi-
lar to the Champaign plan unconstitutional? Are all 
religious exercises, prayer, and Bible reading in the 
schools unconstitutional? As Mr. Justice Frankfurter 
pointed out, as other cases came before the Supreme 
Court, the principle of separation would be unfolded more 
adequately. 
RELEASED TIME FOR OFF-PREMISE RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION 
Five years after the United States Supreme Court 
decision in the McCollum case, the Court rendered a deci-
sion in Zoraoh v. Clauson et al., 343 U. S. 306 (1952). 
1R. Lawrence Siegel, "Church-State Separation and 
the Public Schools," Progressive Education, 26:103-111, 
February, 1949. 
42 
In this decision the Supreme Court upheld a New York 
statute and the action of the school board of New York 
City in providing a "released time" program for religious 
education during public school hours but away from the 
public school buildings as not being in conflict with the 
First Amendment of the Constitution. 
New York City acting in accordance with a New York 
education law permitted its public schools to release pu-
pils upon the written request of the parents for reli-
gious education during school hours. The children not 
released stayed in their classroom. The churches made 
weekly attendance reports to the public schools, listing 
those who had been released for religious Instruction but 
who had not reported to the church that week. This pro-
gram involved neither religious instruction in the public 
school classrooms nor the expenditure of public funds. 
All costs were paid by the religious organizations. 
The appellants in this case were taxpayers and 
residents of New York City who had children attending the 
public schools. They contended that the New York law was 
in essence not different from the one involved in the 
McCollum case. Mr. Justice Douglas stated the appel-
lant's arguments briefly: 
The weight and influence of the school is put behind 
a program for religious instruction; public school 
teachers police it, keeping tab on students who are 
released; the classroom activities come to a halt 
while the students who are released for religious in-
struction are on leave; the school is a crutch on 
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which the churches are leaning for support in their 
religious training; without the cooperation of the 
schools this "released time" program, like the one in 
the McCollum case, would be futile and ineffective.1 
The New York Court of Appeals sustained the law 
against the claim of unconstitutionality. The case was 
then taken to the United States Supreme Court by appeal. 
The state court was sustained by the Supreme Court in a 
six-to-three decision. 
Mr. Justice Douglas in delivering the opinion of 
the Court2 stated that they were not concerned with the 
wisdom of this type of "released time" program, its effi-
ciency from an educational point of view or political 
considerations that may be involved. The problem of the 
Court was to decide "whether New York by this system has 
either prohibited the 'free exercise' of religion or had 
made a law 'respecting an establishment of religion' 
within the meaning of the First Amendment." 
The majority of the Court felt it was evident that 
there was no issue of prohibition of "free exercise" of 
religion in this case. No one was forced to go to reli-
gious instruction and no such instruction was brought 
into the public school classrooms. There was no evidence 
on the record before the Court that indicated coercion 
1Zorach v. Clauson et al.. 343 U. S. 306, 309. 
2lbld., 308-315. 
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was involved. 
Mr. Justice Douglas stated that the Court did not 
see how the New York type of "released time" program made 
a law respecting the establishment of religion within the 
meaning of the First Amendment. He went on to explain 
this judgment in the light of the Court's Interpretation 
of the First Amendment. 
The First Amendment reflects the philosophy that 
Church and State should be separated. Separation must be 
complete when "free exercise" of religion and "establish-
ment of religion" are the issues involved. However, the 
First Amendment does not say that in every case there 
must be separation of Church and State. In fact, it 
states the specific ways in which there can be no con-
certed union or dependence one on the other. "That is 
the common sense of the matter. Otherwise the state and 
religion would be aliens to each other — hostile, suspi-
cious, and even unfriendly." Police and fire protection 
could not be given to religious groups by municipalities. 
Mr. Justice Douglas continued: 
Prayers in our legislative halls; the appeals to the 
Almighty in the messages of the Chief Executive; the 
proclamations making Thanksgiving Day a holiday; 'so 
help me God' in our courtroom oaths — these and all 
other references to the Almighty that run through our 
laws, our public rituals, our ceremonies would be 
flouting the First Amendment. A fastidious atheist 
or agnostic could even object to the supplication 
with which the Court opens each session, 'God save 
the United States and this Honorable Court.' 
If this New York law were nullified, it would have 45 
long reaching effects. A teacher upon written request of 
the parents, permits a Catholic student to be released 
for mass on a Holy Day of Obligation. A Jewish student 
may be excused for Yom Kippur; or a Protestant student 
for a baptismal service. In all cases the teacher may 
also ask for a note from the priest, the rabbi, or the 
minister to make sure the student is not truant. "Whether 
she does It occasionally for a few students, regularly 
for one or pursuant to a systematized program designed to 
further the religious needs of all students, does not 
alter the character of the act." 
Mr. Justice Douglas made this important statement 
concerning the Court's conception of the relationship be-
tween Church and State: 
We are a religious people whose institutions presup-
pose a Supreme Being. We guarantee the freedom to 
worship as one chooses. We make room for as wide a 
variety of beliefs and creeds as the spiritual needs 
of man deem necessary. We sponsor an attitude on the 
part of government that shows no partiality to any 
one group and that lets each flourish according to 
the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its 
dogma. When the state encourages religious instruc-
tion or cooperates with religious authorities by ad-
justing the schedule of public events to sectarian 
needs, it follows the best of our traditions. For it 
then respects the religious nature of our people and 
accommodates the public service to their spiritual 
needs. 
In conclusion, Mr. Justice Douglas stated that 
this problem In constitutional law was a matter of de-
gree. The public classrooms were used for religious 
instruction in the McCollum case. Also, the force of the 
public school was used to promote instruction. In the 
Zorach case, the public schools did no more than accommo-
date their schedules to a program of outside religious 
instruction. The Court would not expand the McCollum de-
cision to include programs such as New York's. They felt 
that the Bill of Rights did not mean to prevent public 
institutions from making adjustments to accommodate the 
religious needs of the people. 
The three dissenting Justices in the Zorach v. 
Clauson case wrote separate opinions. Mr. Justice Black 
in his dissenting opinion1 stated he could see no signifi-
cant difference between the invalid Illinois system and 
that of New York which the Court sustained. The only dif-
ference he felt worthy of mention was that the school 
buildings were used for the religious instruction in 
Illinois, while in New York they were not. He continued: 
In the New York program, as in that of Illinois, the 
school authorities release some of the children on 
the condition that they attend the religion classes, 
get reports on whether they attend, and hold other 
children in the school building until the religious 
hour is over. 
In the McCollum case, the Court stated that Illinois 
could not constitutionally "manipulate the compelled 
classroom hours of its compulsory school machinery so as 
1Ibid., 316-320 
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to channel children into sectarian classes." Yet, the 
Court by sustaining the New York law is holding that New 
York can do this. 
In the remainder of his opinion, Mr. Justice Black 
reaffirmed his belief in the philosophy of separation as 
stated in McCollum and Everson v. Board of Education. 
The plan, purpose, design and consequence of the New York 
program was to help the religious sects get attendants at 
religious education classes through the use of the 
state's compulsory education laws. Mr. Justice Black 
continued: 
Any use of such coercive power by the state to help 
or hinder some religious sects or to prefer all reli-
gious sects over non believers or vice versa is just 
what I think the First Amendment forbids. In con-
sidering whether a state has entered this forbidden 
field the question is not whether it has entered too 
far but whether it has entered at all. New York is 
manipulating its compulsory education laws to help 
religious sects get pupils. This is not separation 
but combination of Church and State. 
Mr. Justice Black noted that it was because the 
Eighteenth Century Americans were a religious people di-
vided by many fighting sects that the First Amendment was 
adopted. This amendment was to insure that no one sect 
or combination of sects could use the government power to 
punish dissenters. The government must remain neutral in 
order to insure freedom to all sects and to all non-
believers. Mr. Justice Black felt: 
It is this neutrality the Court abandons today when 
it treats New York's coercive system as a program 
Ms 
which merely 'encourages religious instruction or 
cooperates with religious authorities.' The abandon-
ment is all the more dangerous to liberty because of 
the Court's legal exaltation of the orthodox and its 
derogation of unbelievers. 
The First Amendment loses much if the believers and non-
believers are no longer entitled to equal justice under 
the law. 
Mr. Justice Black concluded with this statement, 
"Government should not be allowed, under cover of the 
soft euphemism of 'co-operation,' to steal into the 
sacred area of religious choice." 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter delivered a short dissent-
ing statement which he stated was to emphasize his agree-
ment with Mr. Justice Jackson's dissent.1 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion essentially 
dealt with two aspects of the problem in this case. 
First, he noted that a State can provide that classes in 
its school may be dismissed for various reasons. How-
ever, Mr. Justice Frankfurter felt; 
The essence of this case is that the school system 
did not close its doors and did not suspend its oper-
ations. There is all the difference In the world be-
tween letting the children out of school and letting 
some of them out of school into religion classes. 
If all children were released to do as they wished with 
the time, there would be no conflict with the First 
Amendment as applied to states by the Fourteenth. 
1lbid., 320-323. 
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However, the school system is very much in operation dur-
ing the released time. "If its doors are closed, they 
are closed upon those students who do not attend the 
religious instruction in order to keep them within the 
school." 
Second, Mr. Justice Frankfurter felt the Court 
should not rely upon the absence from the record of evi-
dence of coercion in the operation of the system. The 
Court disregarded the fact that when the case came to the 
Supreme Court, the appellants had not been allowed to 
make proof of coercion. The lower court said that such 
proof was irrelevant to the issue of constitutionality. 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter said: 
I cannot see how a finding that coercion was absent, 
deemed critical by this Court in sustaining the prac-
tice, can be made here, when appellants were pre-
vented from making a timely showing of coercion 
because the courts below thought it irrelevant. 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter concluded that the contro-
versy aroused by the attempt to secure religious educa-
tion for public school children would end, if the 
proponents of such programs would allow classes to be 
dismissed without discrimination. He went on to state: 
The unwillingness of the promoters of this movement 
to dispense with such use of the public schools be-
trays a surprising want of confidence in the inherent 
power of the various faiths to draw children to out-
side sectarian classes—an attitude that hardly re-
flects the faith of the greatest religious spirits. 
The final dissenting opinion was delivered by 50 
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Mr. Justice Jackson. He felt that the New York "re-
leased time" program was based upon the use of the 
State's power of coercion, and this was what made the 
plan unconstitutional. 
Mr. Justice Jackson stated that "the plan had two 
stages: first, that the State compel each student to 
yield a large part of his time for public secular educa-
tion; and, second, that some of it be 'released' to him 
on condition that he devote it to sectarian religious 
purposes." The shortening of everyone's school day would 
facilitate voluntary and optional attendance at church 
classes. This could be done if officials felt that the 
length of the school day injured the students by en-
croaching upon their religious opportunity. However, 
this suggestion is rejected because if all students were 
free, many would not go to the church. The New York sys-
tem, therefore, is effective because of the check on 
attendance at the religious classes by the public school. 
In the school, work is more or less suspended dur-
ing the "released time" so that the non religious attend-
ants will not forge ahead of the released students. 
Mr. Justice Jackson stated: 
1Ibid., 323-325 
. . . it [the school] serves as a temporary jail for 51 
a pupil who will not go to church . . . This is 
government constraint in support of religion. It is 
as unconstitutional, in my view, when exerted by in-
direction as when exercised forth rightly, 
Mr. Justice Jackson felt that the majority of the 
Court was confusing an objection to compulsion with an 
objection to religion, "It is possible to hold a faith 
with enough confidence to believe that what should be 
rendered to God does not need to be decided and collected 
by Caesar." When the United States "ceases to be free 
for irreligion it will cease to be free for religion." 
In the conclusion of his opinion, Mr, Justice 
Jackson stated: 
The distinction attempted between that case [McCollum 
v. Board of Education] and this is trivial, almost to 
the point of cynicism, magnifying its nonessential 
details and disparaging compulsion which was the un-
derlying reason for invalidity . . . The wall which 
the Court was professing to erect between Church and 
State has become even more warped and twisted than I 
expected. Today's judgment will be more interesting 
to students of psychology and of the judicial pro-
cesses than to students of constitutional law. 
The majority of the comments by lay persons con-
cerning the Supreme Court's decision in Zorach v. Clauson 
compared this decision with the one in McCollum v. Board 
of Education, and to some extent with the decision in 
Everson v. Board of Education. David Louisell pointed 
out that the Zorach case was significant in that there 
was a change of language from the Everson case and the 
McCollum case. The language in these latter two cases 
had been that government could not aid one or all reli- 52 
gions. In the Zorach case the language i3, "'We are a 
religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme 
Being.'" Also, this change is revealed by the Court's 
opinion that government cooperation with religious au-
thorities in religious education programs "'follows the 
beat of our traditions,'" Mr. Louisell felt that these 
views were a deviation from the underlying philosophy of 
the interpretation of the First Amendment, implicit and 
explicit in the Everson and McCollum cases.1 
Robert Drinan, like David Louisell, noted a shift 
in emphasis by the Supreme Court in the Zorach case from 
the McCollum case. He felt that in the latter case the 
establishment of an absolute doctrine of separation took 
precedence over any attempt to harmonize the contending 
parties. However, in the Zorach decision the Court cor-
rected this "oversight," and it attempted to harmonize 
the interests of the two groups. In this respect the no-
tion was introduced whereby the state may accommodate its 
public institutions to the religious needs and aspira-
tions of the American people. Mr. Drinan felt that this 
notion to a large extent restored religious liberty or 
freedom because the absoluteness of the separation of 
1Louisell, loc. clt. 
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Church and State was negated.1 
Lee 0. Garber pointed out another deviation from 
the McCollum case by the Supreme Court in its opinion in 
the Zorach case. He felt that the Court did not rely as 
heavily on the First Amendment as they had in the McCollum 
case. Also, the Court did not reiterate the legal con-
cept of applying the First Amendment to the states by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. However, he pointed out that the 
Court did not reject or disavow this application. 2 
The Court's retreat from the doctrine of absolute 
separation may be recognized. It is difficult, however, 
to understand the failure of the Court to not perceive 
that in both the New York "released time" program and in 
the Champaign plan attendance was checked and reported to 
the public schools in the same manner. This especially 
true since the Supreme Court invalidated the Champaign 
plan partly on the basis that the compulsory school law 
was used to help provide pupils for religious classes. 
V. T. Thayer and Lee 0. Garber both pointed out this 
fact. They felt that in the New York plan as well as in 
the Champaign plan the operation of the state's compul-
sory education system assisted and was integrated with 
1Robert F. Drinan, "The Supreme Court and Reli-
gion," Commonweal, 56:554-6, September 12, 1952. 
2 Lee 0. Garber, "Zorach Case," The Nation's 
Schools, 50:67-72, August, 1952. 
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the program of religious instruction carried on by separ-
ate religious sects.1 
The Supreme Court to a certain extent clarified 
its position concerning the First Amendment and the "wall 
of separation." However, the Court's opinion in the 
Zorach case applied to a specific situation. It was un-
certain how far a government might go in accommodating 
its institutions to religion. Could this accommodation 
extend to recitation of prayers or Bible reading in the 
public schools? Ten years after the Zorach decision, a 
case which questioned the constitutionality of a state 
written and recommended prayer came before the Supreme 
Court. 
STATE COMPOSED PRAYERS FOR USE IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
In 1962 the United Supreme Court handed down a 
six-to-one decision in Engel et al. v. Vitale et al.. 
370 U. S. 421. The Court held that because of the prohi-
bition of the First Amendment against any law respecting 
an establishment of religion, state officials could not 
compose an official state prayer and require that it be 
recited In the public schools of the State. 
1 Loc. cit.; V. T. Thayer, "Released Time, A Crutch 
for Churches." The Nation. 174:130-132, February 9, 1952. 
Engle v. Vitale, which originated in the state of 
New York, questioned the constitutionality of the use in 
a school district of a prayer composed and recommended by 
the State Board of Regents. It should be noted that the 
Board of Regents has supervisory, executive, and legisla-
tive powers over the State's public school system. 
The prayer referred to in this case was published 
as part of the Board of Regents' "'Statement on Moral and 
Spiritual Training in the Schools.'" The prayer was: 
Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon 
Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, 
our teachers and our Country. 
In recommending this prayer the Board of Regents stated: 
We believe that this Statement will be subscribed to 
by all men and women of good will, and we call upon 
all of them to aid in giving life to our program. 
In accordance with the Board of Regents' recommendation, 
the school district of Hyde Park, New York, directed that 
the Regents' prayer be said aloud by each class in the 
presence of the teachers at the beginning of each day. 
Shortly after the practice of reciting the Board 
of Regents' prayer was adopted by the School District, 
the parents of ten pupils brought action in a New York 
State Court. They stated that the use of this official 
prayer in the public schools was contrary to the beliefs, 
religions, or religious practices of both themselves and 
their children. The parents also charged that both the 
state law authorizing the School District to direct use 
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of prayer in public schools and the School District's 
regulation ordering the recitation of this particular 
prayer violated the clause of the First Amendment of the 
Constitution which prohibits Congress from making a law 
"respecting an establishment of religion," which was made 
applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, 
The New York Court of Appeals sustained the lower state 
courts which had upheld the power of New York to use the 
Regents' prayer as part of the daily procedures of the 
public schools as long as the schools did not compel any 
pupil to join in the prayer over his or his parents' ob-
jection, The United States Supreme Court granted certio-
rari to review this decision involving rights protected 
by the First and the Fourteenth Amendments.1 
Mr. Justice Black in delivering the opinion of the 
Supreme Court2 noted that there was no doubt that the use 
of the Board of Regents' prayer in the classrooms of the 
public schools was a religious activity. The religious 
nature of prayer had been recognized by Thomas Jefferson, 
by the United States Supreme Court, by a committee of the 
New York legislature and by many administrative officials. 
The Board of Regents and the school district conceded the 
religious nature of prayer, however they distinguished 
1Engel et al. v. Vltale et al.. 370 U. S. 421, 
422-424. 
2Loc. cit. 
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this prayer by saying it was based on American spiritual 
heritage. 
The petitioners contended that the prayer was com-
posed to further the Board of Regent' program of promot-
ing religious beliefs. For this reason, its use in the 
public schools breached the constitutional wall of separ-
ation between Church and State. Mr. Justice Black stated 
that the Court agreed with this contention because the 
prohibition against an "establishment of religion" at 
least means that "it is no part of the business of gov-
ernment to compose official prayers for any group of the 
American people to recite as a part of a religious pro-
gram carried on by government." 
Mr. Justice Black continued the opinion of the 
Court by reviewing the history of the attempts to separate 
Church and State. He especially emphasized the efforts 
to ban state prescribed prayers. He noted it was the 
practice of government composing prayers for religious 
services that caused many persons to leave England and to 
come to America for religious freedom. The Book of Com-
mon Prayer, which was created under governmental direc-
tion and approved by Acts of Parliament in 1548 end 1549, 
prescribed in detail the accepted form and content of 
prayers and other religious ceremonies to be used in the 
established Church of England. There developed a con-
stant struggle between the various powerful groups which 
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represented the different religious views of the people. 
These groups attempted to win favor with the government 
in order to obtain changes in or amendments to the Book 
of Common Prayer which would fit their particular reli-
gious beliefs. Some groups which lacked the political 
power to influence the government left England for Amer-
ica in order to escape the established Church of England. 
Some of these groups that came to America soon 
found themselves sufficiently in control of the colonial 
government to pass laws making their own religion the 
official religion of their colony. Until the Revolution-
ary War there were established churches in at least eight 
of the thirteen colonies and established religions in at 
least four of the other five. However, after the Revolu-
tionary War intense opposition developed to the practice 
of establishing religion by law. This movement became a 
powerful force in Virginia where in 1785-1786 under the 
leadership of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison the 
"Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty" was passed. Other 
such legislation was being considered and passed in other 
states. 
A widespread awareness among the American people 
of the dangers of the union of Church and State had de-
veloped by the time the Constitution was adopted. These 
people realized that the greatest danger to personal 
freedom of worship lay in the government's approving one 
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particular form of prayer or religious service. The Con-
stitution was intended in part to avert this kind of dan-
ger by leaving the government of the United States in the 
hands of the people rather than in the hands of a mon-
arch. However, the founding fathers felt that the First 
Amendment was also necessary. Mr. Justice Black stated: 
The First Amendment was added to the Constitution to 
stand as a guarantee that neither the power nor the 
prestige of the Federal Government would be used to 
control, support or influence the kinds of prayer the 
American people can say—that the people's religions 
must not be subjected to the pressures of government 
for change each time a new political administration 
is elected to office. Under that Amendment's prohi-
bition against governmental establishment of reli-
gion, as reinforced by the provisions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, government in this country, be 
it state or federal, is without power to prescribe by 
law any particular form of prayer which is to be used 
as an official prayer in carrying on any program of 
governmentally sponsored religious activity. 
The majority of the Court, Mr. Justice Black con-
tinued, felt that it was clear " . . . that New York's 
state prayer program officially establishes the religious 
beliefs embodied In the Regents' prayer." The prayer is 
not freed from the limitations of the Establishment 
Clause even though it may be non denomlnational and stu-
dents may choose to not participate in its saying. 
Mr. Justice Black continued with a history of the 
purpose and meaning of the Establishment Clause. The 
Establishment Clause's " . . . first and most immediate 
purpose rested in the belief that a union of government 
and religion tends to destroy government and to degrade 
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religion." It is history that when a government allied 
itself with one particular religion it incurred the 
hatred and disrespect of those who held contrary beliefs. 
Also, a religion that relied on the support of a govern-
ment lost the respect of many people. "Another purpose 
of the Establishment Clause rested upon an awareness of 
the historical fact that govemmentally established reli-
gions and religious persecutions go hand in hand." There 
were persecutions both in America and England of persons 
who refused to worship In the manner that government pre-
scribed. Part of the reason why the " . . . Pounders 
brought into being our Nation, our Constitution, and our 
Bill of Rights . . . " was to escape such persecutions. 
The majority of the Court felt that, "The New York laws 
officially prescribing the Regents' prayer are incon-
sistent both with the purposes of the Establishment 
Clause and with the Establishment Clause itself." 
Mr. Justice Black pointed out that by applying the 
Constitution in a manner which prohibited states from es-
tablishing religious services in public schools did not 
indicate a hostility toward religion or toward prayers. 
Men with a faith in the power of prayer were instrumental 
in the adoption of the Constitution and the Bill of 
Rights. These men realized that the First Amendment was 
Intended to keep government from shackling " . . . men's 
tongues to make them speak only the religious thoughts 
61 
that government wanted them to pray to." Therefore, 
Mr. Justice Black concluded: 
It is neither sacrilegious or anti-religious to say 
that each separate government in this country should 
stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning 
official prayers and leave that purely religious 
function to the people themselves and to those the 
people choose to look to for religious guidance. 
Mr. Justice Black pointed out in a footnote in the 
Court's opinion, that the decision in this case was not 
inconsistent with the fact that school children and 
others are officially encouraged to recite such documents 
as the Declaration of Independence which contains refer-
ences to the Deity or by singing official anthems which 
Include the composer's professions of faith in a Supreme 
Being, or with the fact that there are many manifesta-
tions in our public life of belief in God. "Such patri-
otic or ceremonial occasions bear no true resemblance to 
the unquestioned religious exercise that the State of New 
York has sponsored in this instance." 
Mr. Justice Douglas began his concurring opinion1 
by pointing out that it was customary to treat a consti-
tutional question In its narrowest form. However, he 
felt that "at times the setting of the question gives it 
a form and content which no abstract treatment could 
give." The question in Engel v. Vitale is whether 
1Ibid,. 437-444. 
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Government can constitutionally finance a religious exer-
cise, "Our system at the Federal and state levels is 
presently honeycombed with such financing." In a foot-
note in his opinion, Mr, Justice Douglas pointed out many 
of the "aids" to religion that have already been brought 
out in the other cases discussed. He felt that such fi-
nancing or "aid" was unconstitutional whatever form it 
took. 
Mr. Justice Douglas pointed out two things that 
this case did not involve. First, there was no coercion 
involved. A student in the New York public schools is 
not under compulsion to recite the Regents' prayer. In 
fact, " . . . the only one who need utter the prayer is 
the teacher. . . Students can stand mute or even leave 
the classroom if they desire." 
Second, McCollum v. Board of Education does not 
decide this case. The situation under question in the 
McCollum case involved the influence of the teaching 
staff which was brought to bear on the students by the 
fact that they either had to attend religious exercises 
or go to some other place in the school building for the 
continuance of their secular studies. Also, attendance 
at the religious classes was reported to the secular 
teachers. In Engel v. Vitale school buildings are used 
to say the prayer and the teaching staff is employed to 
lead the pupils in it, but there is no attempt at 
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indoctrination or exposition. 
Therefore, Mr. Justice Black stated the question 
in Engel v. Vitale is a narrow one. "It is whether New 
York oversteps the bounds when it finances a religious 
exercise." 
Mr. Justice Douglas continued by pointing out that 
what New York does in opening its public schools is what 
the Supreme Court does in opening court and what both 
Houses of Congress do in opening their sessions. The 
Court Crier after announcing the convening of the Court 
aids, "'God save the United States and this Honorable 
Court.'" Both Houses of Congress have chaplains which 
offer a prayer at the beginning of each day. In each in-
stance, including that of the New York public schools, 
the person leading the prayer is a public employee, and 
no open coercion is involved. However, Mr. Justice 
Douglas stated: 
. . . for me the principle is the same, no matter how 
briefly the prayer is said, for in each of the in-
stances given the person praying is a public official 
on the public payroll, performing a religious exer-
cise in a governmental institution. 
Mr. Justice Douglas felt that the authorization by 
New York of the prayer involved In this case did not con-
stitute an establishment of religion in the historic 
sense. However, once a government finances a religious 
exercise it introduces a divisive influence into the com-
munity. The First Amendment, Mr. Justice Douglas felt, 
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meant that government must be neutral in its position in 
regard to religion. The philosophy is that the agnostic 
or the atheist is as entitled to his beliefs as those who 
accept a religion professing a belief in God. 
In conclusion, Mr. Justice Douglas stated he felt 
that New York by authorizing the prayer involved in this 
case broke with the traditional belief inherent in the 
First Amendment's philosophy. This philosophy is that in 
order to maintain religious freedom no sustenance will be 
given to religion by the state, and also, religion will 
be free from other interferences by the state. 
Mr. Justice Stewart in his dissenting opinion1 
pointed out that the Court could not say anybody's privi-
lege of free exercise of religion had been repressed. 
Yet, the Court said that by permitting school children to 
say "this simple prayer" the New York authorities estab-
lished "'an official religion.'" Mr. Justice Stewart 
felt the Court had misapplied "a great constitutional 
principle." He could not see how an "'official reli-
gion'" was established by letting those who wanted to say 
a prayer say it. "On the contrary, I think that to deny 
the wish of these school children to join in reciting 
this prayer is to deny them the opportunity of sharing in 
the spiritual heritage of our Nation." 
1Ibid., 444-450. 
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Mr. Justice Stewart felt no light was thrown on 
the case by the Court's historical review of the quarrels 
over the Book of Common Prayer, of the established church 
in England, and of the movement from established churches 
in America, As already implied, Mr, Justice Stewart felt 
that in Engel v. Vitale, the Supreme Court was not deal-
ing with an establishment of a state church. He felt 
that what was relevant in this case wa3 "... the his-
tory of the religious tradition of our people, reflected 
in countless practices of the Institutions and officials 
of our government." 
Mr, Justice Stewart gave some examples of these 
practices. The sessions of the Supreme Court are opened 
by the invocation of the Crier, Both Houses of Congress 
open their daily sessions with prayer. Each of the Pres-
idents of the United States from George Washington to 
John F. Kennedy in his inaugural address has asked the 
protection and help of God. 
Mr. Justice Stewart noted that the Court in Engel 
v. Vitale was saying that " . . . the state and Federal 
governments are without constitutional power to prescribe 
any particular form of words to be recited by any group 
of the American people on any subject touching religion." 
He gave these examples where this principle seems to have 
been violated by the Federal government. The "Star-
Spangled Banner," made the National Anthem by Congress in 
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1931, contains these verses: 
'Blest with victory and peace, may the heav'n rescued 
land, Praise the Pow'r that hath made and preserved 
us a nation! Then conquer we must, when our cause it 
is just, And this be our motto 'In God is our Trust.' ' 
The words "under God" were added by Congress to the Pledge 
of Allegiance in 1954. In 1952 Congress enacted legisla-
tion calling on the President each year to proclaim a 
National Day of Prayer. Since 1865 the words "In God We 
Trust" have been impressed on United States' coins. 
Mr. Justice Stewart stated that he felt that the point he 
wished to make by citing these examples could be summed 
up in this sentence from Zorach v. Clauson, "'We are a 
religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme 
Being.'" 
In conclusion, Mr. Justice Stewart stated that he 
did not feel that the Supreme Court, Congress and the 
President by their actions had established an "'official 
religion.'" Also, he felt New York had not in this case 
established an "'official religion.'" He stated: 
What each has done has been to recognize and to fol-
low the deeply entrenched and highly cherished 
spiritual traditions of our Nation—traditions which 
come down to us from those who almost two hundred 
years ago avowed their 'firm Reliance on the Protec-
tion of divine Providence' when they proclaimed the 
freedom and independence of this brave new world. 
Lay persons' interpretations of the Supreme Court 
decision in Engel v. Vitale reveal a disagreement as to 
what may be implied from the Court's opinion in this 
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case. The opinions of the lay persons may be divided 
into two groups. (1) Those who felt the Supreme Court 
decision placed a ban on all religious exercises in the 
public schools, and (2) those who felt that the Supreme 
Court invalidated only state written or prescribed prayers. 
Those lay persons who felt that the Supreme Court 
decision in Engel v. Vitale Implied that all religious 
ceremonies provided or sponsored by the state in public 
schools were unconstitutional, tended to view the Court's 
decision in its broadest form. They seemed to view the 
decision as not just a negation of a state written prayer, 
but also, as a ban on Baccalaureate services, Christmas 
and Easter programs, devotional Bible reading, and the 
recitation of the Lord's Prayer. Lee 0. Garber felt that 
the Supreme Court probably put a ban on such religious 
practices as mentioned.1 Leo Pfeffer was more emphatic 
than Mr. Garber in his belief that the above-mentioned 
practices were now unconstitutional. He definitely felt 
all non-denominational religious practices were as uncon-
stitutional as those frankly sectarian. Mr. Pfeffer felt 
that the decision in this case was a return to the strict 
2 separation revealed in the McCollum case. 
1 Lee 0. Garber, "Prayer Barred: What It Means," 
The Nation's Schools. 70:54-55, August, 1962. 
2Leo Pfeffer, "The New York Regents' Prayer Case 
(Engel v. Vitale)," A Journal of Church and State. 
4:150-158, November, 1962. 
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The tendency of some lay persons to interpret the 
Supreme Court decision in these broad terms caused defi-
nite opposition by some of these persons to the opinion 
of the Court, Ex-President Hoover stated, "'. . . the 
interpretation of the Constitution by the Supreme Court 
on prayer in our schools is a disintegration of one of 
the most sacred of American heritages.'"1 Several Con-
gressmen interpreted the Engel v. Vitale in the same man-
ner. Senator Herman Talmadge of Georgia, accused the 
Court of "'reading alien meanings into the Constitution 
and seeking in the past to change our form of government 
... but never in the wildest excesses ... have they 
gone as far as they did . . .,'" In this decision. Sena-
tor Robert C. Byrd of Virginia, asked whether this deci-
sion meant the American people were ready to embrace the 
"'foul concept of atheism.'" He continued, "'Is this not 
in fact the first step on the road to promoting atheistic 
and agnostic beliefs?'" Representative Henry C. 
Schodeberg of Wisconsin, proposed a Constitutional amend-
ment which would allow the official recognition "'of God 
in prayer in schools.'"2 
1Herbert Hoover, cited in "Religion Sponsored by 
the State," A Journal of Church and State. 4:141-147, 
November, 1962. 
Congressmen cited in "News in Review," The 
Nation's Schools. 70:80, August, 1962. 
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Rheinhold Niebuhr also opposed the Supreme Court 
decision, but his opinion was stated in more moderate 
language. He felt that religion in America would not 
"'fall by the . . . absence of the Regents' Prayer,'" but 
he thought the Court's decision was extravagant. "'To 
exclude the Regents' Prayer is to insist that schools be 
absolutely secular in every respect, which is not what 
the First Amendment intended.'" Mr. Niebuhr thought that 
by the Court outlawing this prayer which simply expressed 
"'a mood of religious reverence,'" it was practically 
suppressing religion, especially in the public schools.1 
Those lay persons who felt that the Supreme 
Court's decision in Engel v. Vitale meant only a ban on 
state prescribed and state written prayers seemed to in-
terpret the Court's opinion in a narrow form. Senator 
Kenneth B. Keating of New York, pointed out that the dom-
inant fact in the ruling was a prayer composed by the New 
York Board of Regents. Therefore, it can be concluded 
that voluntary, non-sectarian school religious exercises 
may be permissible under this ruling as long as they are 
2 not written by state official. 
1Rheinhold Niebuhr, cited in The New Republic. 
147:3-5, July 9, 1962. 
2Senator Kenneth B. Keating, cited in "News in 
Review," The Nation's Schools. 70:80, August, 1962. 
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Editorial comments on this case in The Hew Repub-
lic and A Journal of Church and State indicated that they 
felt the Court decision did not prohibit public schools 
from allowing the saying of prayers, devotional exercises 
or Bible reading.1 In The New Republic this interpreta-
tion, particularly in regard to prayer, was stated as 
follows: 
It [the Supreme Court decision] does not preclude 
public school prayers which are in use as the result 
of custom or conventional practice by the consent of 
all groups in a community — a prayer drafted, let us 
say, by an inter-faith committee.2 
Different implications may be drawn from the Su-
preme Court decision in Engel v. Vitale. However, these 
Implications are not fact. This was indicated by Lee 0. 
Garber. He stated that this decision was applicable only 
to like or factual situations such as those found in New 
York. He also noted that until the constitutionality of 
practices such as Bible reading have been ruled upon by 
the Supreme Court, the decision in Engel v. Vitale will 
remain controversial.3 It may be added that these reli-
gious practices that some felt were implicated as being 
banned by the Supreme Court in this decision, are not 
1The New Republic. 147:3-5, July 9, 1962; A 
Journal of Church and State. 4:141-147, November , 1962. 
2The New Republic, l47:3-5. July 9, 1962. 
3Garber, loc. cit. 
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actually unconstitutional until ruled so by the Supreme 
Court. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this study was to (1) examine four 
United States Supreme Court cases concerning the rela-
tionship between religion and the public schools, (2) to 
analyze the opinions of the Justices on the cases, and 
(3) to consider the interpretations of these decisions by 
various lay persons. 
Under the Constitution of the United States the 
legal status of religion in connection with the public 
schools as explicitly defined by the United States Su-
preme Court may be summarized as follows: 
1. Free bus transportation may be provided for children 
attending parochial schools. 
2. A "released time" program in which children upon the 
request of their parents may attend religious in-
struction classes during public school hours and on 
public school premises is unconstitutional. 
3. A "released time" program in which children are ex-
cused from school by request of the parents to attend 
religious instruction classes off the school premises 
is constitutional. 
4. State officials may not write and recommend a prayer 
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to be used in the public schools. 
This summary seems to reveal inconsistencies in 
the Supreme Court's view of the relationship between re-
ligion and the public schools. It must be remembered 
that each decision dealt with a specific situation and 
set of facts. Therefore, it is impossible to make a sin-
gle statement which describes the legal relationship be-
tween religion and the public schools. 
Although the Supreme Court decision in each case 
dealt with a specific situation, the Justices, whether 
delivering the opinion of the Court, a concurring opinion 
or a dissenting opinion, also elaborated on their concep-
tion of the meaning of the First Amendment and on the 
term "wall of separation." It was upon these opinions 
that lay persons based their interpretations of the Su-
preme Court's decision in each case. 
For the most part, these lay persons chose to 
either interpret the opinion of the Supreme Court as sim-
ply an approval or a ban on the practice dealt with in 
the case, or to draw wide implications from the opinion 
which encompassed practices other than the one specially 
dealt with in the case. Some lay persons chose to accept 
the dissenting opinion or opinions in a case as the most 
accurate interpretation of the facts of the case when 
history and the First Amendment were applied to them. 
It is important to note that none of the Justices 
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in their opinions dealing with a case denied the impor-
tance of religion and its influence on American institu-
tions, specifically on the public schools. Also, the 
same historical facts and interrelationships between 
Church and State were quoted by different Justices to 
support varying views on the meaning and the purpose of 
the First Amendment. Disagreement seems to center In the 
question of the proper application of the historical 
facts and the language of the First Amendment. The Jus-
tices of the Supreme Court involved in the four cases 
discussed and the lay persons interpreting the Court's 
decision seem to disagree as to when a state passed be-
yond the "verge of power" constitutionally given to them 
by the First Amendment as applied to states by the Four-
teenth Amendment. 
It may be concluded that more cases concerning the 
relationship between the public schools and religion will 
come before the Supreme Court In an effort to further de-
fine this relationship. This will be true as long as the 
Supreme Court makes its decisions deal explicitly with 
only the situation in question, and the states and com-
munities apply the decision in its narrowest form. 
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The purpose of this study was to (1) examine four 
United States Supreme Court cases concerning the rela-
tionship between religion and the public schools, (2) to 
analyze the opinions of the Justices on the cases, and 
(3) to consider the interpretations of these decisions by 
various lay persons. 
In Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S, 1 
(1947), the Supreme Court ruled that a state may provide 
free bus transportation for children attending parochial 
schools. Mr. Justice Black in the opinion of the Court 
stated that the state had not violated the First Amend-
ment. Providing transportation for school children was 
part of their public welfare program, not an "aid" to re-
ligion. Mr. Justice Jackson and Mr. Justice Rutledge 
dissented. They felt that the state was helping certain 
children obtain a religious education. This violated the 
First Amendment. Lay persons felt that one main question 
was left unanswered by this decision. How far may a 
state validly go under the public welfare theory before 
it violated the First Amendment? 
In Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educa-
tion, 333 U. S. 203 (1948), Supreme Court attempted 
to clarify its interpretation of the First Amendment. 
The Court declared unconstitutional the Champaign, 
Illinois, "released time" program which allowed religious 
instruction on public school premises during school 
2 
hours. Mr. Justice Black in the opinion of the Court, 
and Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Jackson in 
concurring opinions, felt Champaign was using a tax 
supported institution for the furthering of religious 
instruction. This violated the "establishment of reli-
gion" clause of the First Amendment. Mr. Justice Reed 
dissented. He felt that a non-sectarian group sponsoring 
a program of religious instruction which used public 
school buildings was not violating the First Amendment. 
Lay persons either agreed with Mr. Justice Reed that the 
Court had falsely interpreted the First Amendment, or 
agreed with the Court's opinion. The latter group was 
uncertain whether the ban extended to "released time" 
programs that differed from the Champaign plan. 
In 1952 the Supreme Court declared constitutional 
a New York "released time" program in which religious 
classes were conducted off school premises (Zorach v. 
Clauson et al., 343 U. S. 306). Mr. Justice Douglas de-
livering the Court's opinion stated, "We are a religious 
people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." 
When the State cooperates with religious authorities, it 
follows the best of American traditions. Mr. Justice 
Black, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, and Mr. Justice Jackson 
dissented. They could see no significant difference be-
tween the New York and the Champaign "released time" 
plans. Both used the public school to get participants. 
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Lay persons felt that the main deviation by the Court in 
this case from the McCollum case was that the doctrine of 
absolute separation of Church and State was negated. 
In Engel et al. v. Vitale et al., 370 U. S. 421 
(1962), the Supreme Court held it unconstitutional for 
state officials to write a prayer for use in the public 
schools. Mr. Justice Black in the opinion of the Court 
stated that the "establishment" clause of the First 
Amendment meant government could not compose official 
prayers for a group of Americans to recite, Mr. Justice 
Douglas concurred with this interpretation of the First 
Amendment. Mr, Justice Stewart dissented. He felt that 
the state had only recognized the spiritual traditions of 
the United States. Lay persons disagreed as to whether 
this decision placed a ban only on state composed prayers 
or whether it also implied a ban on religious holiday 
programs, Bible reading and Baccalaureate services. 
Bach of these cases dealt with a specific situa-
tion. Therefore, it is impossible to make a single 
statement describing the legal relationship between reli-
gion and the public schools. It is important to note 
that no Justice denied the importance of religion and its 
influence In the United States, particularly in the pub-
lic schools. As long as the Supreme Court decisions deal 
with specific situations, cases will appear before the 
Supreme Court in an effort to define the relationship be-
tween religion and the public schools. 
